Rules of a Sport- Specific Arbitration Process as an Instrument of Policy Making by Findlay, Hilary A.
Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 1 Fall Article 7
Rules of a Sport- Specific Arbitration Process as an
Instrument of Policy Making
Hilary A. Findlay
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Hilary A. Findlay, Rules of a Sport- Specific Arbitration Process as an Instrument of Policy Making, 16 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 73 (2005)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol16/iss1/7
RULES OF A SPORT-SPECIFIC
ARBITRATION PROCESS AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF POLICY MAKING
HILARY A. FINDLAY*
INTRODUCTION
Disputes in sport are inevitable, particularly in the areas of team selection
and eligibility and particularly before a major competition such as the Olympic
Games.' An increasing number of such disputes are being heard by way of
sport-specific independent arbitration. James Nafziger calls it a "growth
industry" 2 and views the expanded role of the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS) as one of the most important developments in sports law during the past
several years. 3  And over the recent past, programs for sport-specific
independent arbitration have emerged in a number of countries including the
United States, New Zealand, Great Britain, and Canada.
4
The advantages of sport-specific independent arbitration are well
established; however, the underlying premise of this paper is that the
arbitration process, and more specifically the rules of arbitration, should be
designed to support and indeed, facilitate the desired function of independent
arbitration. This paper will look at the intersection between certain rules of
the arbitration mechanism and the underlying policy rationale for such a
mechanism in the first place. It will begin however, with a review of the
advantages of implementing a specific arbitration program in the sport context.
* Ph.D., LL.B., Associate Professor, Department of Sport Management, Brock University,
Ontario, Canada.
1. Hilary A. Findlay & Rachel Corbett, Principles Underlying the Adjudication Disputes
Preceding the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games: Notes for Adjudicators, 1 ENT. L. 109 (2002);
Susan Haslip, A Consideration for the Need of a National Dispute Resolution System for National
Sport Organizations in Canada. 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 245 (2001).
2. James A.R. Nafziger, Arbitration of Rights and Obligations in the International Sports Arena,
35 VAL. U. L. REV. 357 (2001).
3. Id.
4. See Paul Hayes, Current Problems in the Resolution of Sporting Disputes in Australia, 2 INT'L
SPORTS L. REV. 22 (2004); Nafziger, supra note 2, at 357.
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I. ADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION OVER LITIGATION
The advantages of independent arbitration of sport disputes, over the
litigation of such disputes, are now generally accepted. 5 The advantages have
typically been identified as the ability to obtain a timely hearing, lower overall
costs than litigation, the ability to have the decision made by an independent
expert familiar with sport issues, and, in general, a dispute resolution process
that is more sensitive to sport needs.6
A. Timely Hearing
Many disputes involving selection issues inevitably arise on the eve of a
competition, leaving little time for the parties to seek redress. Last minute
hearings, while not necessarily the most desirable, 7 can nonetheless be
accommodated by independent arbitration - and indeed have been.8 Rules for
arbitration typically allow for the abridgement of timelines and hearings can
be accommodated either by vive voce presentation (in person or by
telephone/video conference call) or by a documentary review (or a
combination of both). A pool of adjudicators is typically available, and where
a major multi-sport event such as the Olympic Games is happening,
adjudicators can be located at the site of the actual competition. 9
5. Hayes, supra note 4, at 22.
6. Arbitration is but one type of alternate dispute resolution process; however, it seems to be the
central focus of the sport's system of dispute resolution. Nonetheless, the general attraction of
arbitration, not just in sport, but in other environments as well, relates to cost efficiencies, timeliness
of the process, the potential for flexibility within its procedures, and its topic or area specific
sensitivity, among other factors. See Marvin J. Huberman, Integrating Alternative Dispute Resolution
Into Administrative Justice Systems: Improving Society and Justice (Mar. 1997) (unpublished final
report for L.L.M., Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Ontario, Canada) (on file with author).
7. It may be, however, that time exigencies could make even such programs of arbitration
inappropriate for certain sport disputes. Already it is becoming evident that the CAS Ad Hoc
Tribunal may not provide sufficient time for an acceptable hearing involving alleged doping
infractions during a major event such as the Olympic Games. See Richard McLaren, The CAS Ad
Hoc Division at the Athens Olympic Games, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 175 (2004). The Canadian
experience in arbitrating selection disputes during the lead up to the Athens Olympics may suggest
that certain, more complex last minute selection arbitrations cannot properly and fairly be heard.
8. While it is possible to obtain last minute injunctions from the courts, the process can be
difficult to navigate and virtually impossible to do so without legal counsel and can rarely
accommodate the geographic separation of many of the parties, particularly where athletes and other
personnel are getting ready to travel to a competition - or have already departed.
9. In the case of the Olympic Games, since 1996 an ad hoc CAS process has been located on-site
to hear matters arising from the Games. Matthieu Reeb, The Court ofArbitration for Sport, available
at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/histoire/frmhist.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
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B. Reduced Cost
Often, although certainly not always, costs of arbitration can be much less
than those involved in litigation. Of course, there are many variables to
consider in adding up the costs of arbitration - the complexity of the matter,
the number of parties involved, the time spent in a hearing, whether legal
counsel is involved and the format of the hearing (in person or telephone/video
conference call) to name but a few. And while costs may be less than those of
litigation, this does not mean arbitration is necessarily inexpensive,
particularly for the vast majority of amateur athletes who have limited
financial resources.10
C. Independent Expert Adjudicator
A significant factor affecting the ability of sport organizations to resolve
disputes using their own internal appeal procedures is the inherent bias,
whether perceived or actual, of such a procedure. I Within the context of the
sport organization and the selection of an athlete to a team, it is typically the
organization that establishes the selection criteria and process, makes the
selection, establishes the appeal policy, and manages the appeal hearing. The
athlete who may be appealing some aspect of a selection process sees himself
or herself battling a decision of the organization (or a decision of a person
such as a coach whom it is perceived the organization will support and defend)
using the process of the organization often before decision-makers appointed
by the organization. 12
Further, in an arbitration process, adjudicators can be selected for their
legal expertise as well as their knowledge of the sport system and sport-related
issues. 13 It has been noted that "sport-related disputes tend to rest on issues of
10. Under the ADRsportRED arbitration program, costs can range from the $200 application fee
to thousands of dollars in legal fees. Further, the awarding of costs under the rules of arbitration may
impact the relative inexpensiveness of the process. In Wilton v. Softball Can. (SDRCC July 16,
2004), http://www.adrsportred.ca/resource-centre/pdf/english/S-947124.pdf, the adjudicator awarded
costs to both the complainant ($1,500) and the affected third parties (each of the six affected parties
were awarded $500 each).
11. Haslip, supra note 1, at 253; Hayes, supra note 4, at 30. Of course, organizations, including
sport organizations are fully entitled to deal with matters internally. Indeed, as a principle of law,
complainants must, where feasible, exhaust their internal remedies before seeking the assistance of
the courts. SARA BLAKE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CANADA 157 (3d ed. 2001).
12. There are ways organizations can reduce such concerns. For example, the organization can
seek persons outside the organization to sit as adjudicators or athletes can nominate adjudicators.
13. While intuitively it makes sense that it is advantageous in a sport-specific arbitration process
to have adjudicators who are sensitive to the contingencies and vagaries of sport, the nature and form
of this expertise is not so clear, nor is the criteria for measuring such expertise.
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fact, rather than on complex issues of law," and very often involve the
interpretation or application of an organization's policy.' 4 Thus, familiarity
with sport governance and policy could be an asset. Some of the sport-
specific issues to which adjudicators must be sensitive include: the timing of
the hearing, particularly where competitive timelines loom; power imbalances
between parties including coaches, athletes, and organizational
representatives; prior sport decisions of a similar nature; the expertise of
coaches and others in the selection process and the role of their discretion in
such matters; the situation faced by affected third parties, particularly in
selection matters where the affected party is often a teammate of the
complainant; the location of parties, who are often attending competitions and
thus not physically available; the nature and availability of documentation that
may need to be disclosed; the fact that many athletes are not familiar with the
adjudicative process and may not have the resources to seek counsel, to name
but a few.
For all these reasons and others, the case for a system of arbitration to deal
with the increasing number of disputes being raised in the sport domain is
powerful and has, in large part, been borne out in practice as measured against
the factors mentioned above. Arbitrations, on the whole, have been carried out
quickly, relatively inexpensively, and by expert arbitrators. All of these
factors relate to how an arbitration system should be carried out and the
advantages of so doing. A more fundamental, and arguably more important,
question revolves around the role or function of such arbitration in the broader
dispute resolution program of the sport system. The arbitration process, apart
from being a mechanism of dispute resolution, is also an instrument of policy.
As such, its function must be clearly understood in terms of the purpose or
need that arbitration is intended to meet, and its structure must be carefully
designed to support that function and thus meet the need.
II. THE FUNCTION OF ARBITRATION IN THE CANADIAN SPORT SYSTEM
Apart from making the adjudicative process more efficient, less costly and
more sport-friendly, what is the function of an arbitration process designed
specifically for the amateur sport system? Where and how does it fit into the
overall sport system? Is it intended to be a form of judicial review of internal
organizational decisions? Or, is it intended to be a second tier of appeal after
the internal appeal of the sport organization, or even a replacement of the
internal appeal? What is the appropriate scope of review and standard of
14. Richard McLaren, A New Order: Athletes' Rights and the Court of Arbitration at the
Olympic Games, 7 OLYMPIKA 1, 2 (1998).
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review to be used: that of the organization in its own internal procedures; that
used by the courts in a judicial review; or some other independently
determined standard? Is the arbitration system intended to be a review for
errors that may have been made within the internal appeal process, or a whole
new review of the situation, such as in a hearing de novo? 15 What can or
should be reviewed?
These are important questions to consider, particularly in the context of a
multi-layered sport dispute resolution system, and the answers will be
dependent on the perceived (and, hopefully, stated) function of the system of
arbitration that has been put in place. Indeed, it is argued here that such
considerations should inform, if not determine, the very procedures and rules
of arbitration. Structure should follow function, not the other way around.
The arbitration process, and most particularly the rules of arbitration, should
be structured so as to fulfill the function contemplated for such arbitration and
ensure it plays not only an appropriate role in the sport system but, as well, the
intended role in the resolution of disputes in sport.16
The case of Matt Lindland, a United States Olympic wrestler, stands as a
clear example of a case where "function followed form"1 7 in a dispute
resolution system and as a case that eventually led to significant unintended
consequences, chaos for all parties involved, and a total of some fifteen
judicial or quasi-judicial interventions. 18 During the course of the 2000
United States Olympic wrestling trials, Lindland sought to appeal the outcome
of one of his matches. He was denied at two levels of appeal within the
United States Wresting Association, and as a result, his opponent was named
to the U.S. Olympic Wrestling team (thus now also involving the U.S.
Olympic Committee (USOC)). Lindland subsequently applied for
independent arbitration of the matter, as he was entitled to do under the terms
of the U.S. Amateur Sports Act. 19 Unfortunately, the rules of arbitration did
not allow for the affected athlete, Keith Sieracki, who had now been named to
the Olympic team, to be a party to the proceedings. Sieracki eventually
initiated his own arbitration in a wholly independent proceeding from that of
Lindland. Lindland was successful in his arbitration as was Sieracki in his.
15. This largely turns on the grounds permitted for an appeal.
16. The same comments are appropriate for the development of an appeal policy within a sport
organization - the form of the appeal process should follow the function the appeal mechanism is to
fill. For example, will the appeal review the merits of the original decision or will it be a review for
errors made in the original decision-making process?
17. Nafziger, supra note 2, at 361.
18. Steven J. Thompson, Olympic Team Arbitrations: The Case of Olympic Wrestler Matt
Lindland, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 407 (2001).
19. Nafziger, supra note 2, at 362.
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Each applied to the courts to have his arbitral decision upheld. The U.S.
Wrestling Association and the USOC were now in an uncomfortably
untenable position faced with two completely incompatible decisions as a
result of a multiplicity of different proceedings. Eventually, the two matters
were consolidated and a single outcome achieved. However, as noted by
James Nafziger, "[t]he problem lay not in the second arbitration [i.e., that of
Sieracki] itself but in the structure of dispute resolution that encourages
proliferation and, worse yet, redundancy of proceedings." 20
The case clearly highlights the need to consider and define carefully what
sort of decisions ought to be reviewed (or not reviewed) and by whom, who
the parties to an adjudication should be, and any limitations that should be put
on the scope of a review by an adjudicator (that is, should an adjudicator be
able to review a matter on its merits or should he or she be limited to simply a
review of any procedural or jurisdictional errors that may have taken place in
the preceding hearing). 21 Also, where an adjudicator finds in favor of the
complainant, should that adjudicator be able to substitute his or her own
decision for that of the original, but flawed, decision or should that flawed
decision be sent back to the original decision-maker to correct the error and
reconsider the matter? Should the adjudicator's authority extend to modifying,
directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, the underlying rules or
policies of the organization from which the original decision emanated? The
answers to all these questions, it is suggested, flow from a careful and
necessary consideration of the intended function of each stage of a dispute
resolution system - from original decision to appeal to independent arbitration,
and should be answered in the careful design of the rules under which the
arbitration mechanism operates.
Now may be an opportune time to consider just such considerations in the
context of rules of arbitration in sport disputes, as Canada implements its
national dispute resolution system specifically for sport. In particular, the next
sections of this article will question: first, what the appropriate scope of review
of a decision is for an arbitrator acting within the context of an independent
arbitration of a sport dispute; second, what standard of review should be
applied to such a review, and third, what scope of authority should an
arbitrator have in applying a remedy where an error is found in the original
decision? These three questions have been selected because together they
constitute the crucial policy aspect of an arbitration system (as opposed to the
distinctly procedural rules that allow the system to operate).
Given that the answers to these questions should flow from, and be
20. Id.at371.
21. See id.
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congruent with the underlying rationale for the implementation of such an
independent arbitration system (i.e., the function of the system in terms of how
it contributes to a larger process or outcome), it is important to briefly examine
the origins of the program and the existing dispute resolution procedures
within the Canadian system (which, in fact, are similar to that in many other
domestic sport systems). 22
From a historical perspective, the Canadian sport community has long
considered a dedicated sport-specific national dispute resolution system to be
desirable.23 In 1994, the Canadian Sport Council (an umbrella organization
made up of national sport governing organizations) initiated a two-year pilot
project of such a program. 24 Unfortunately before the end of the pilot project,
the Council was dissolved, effectively ending the program. It was not until
January 2000 that serious efforts were once again made towards development
of another formal alternate dispute resolution system for sport.25 Then-
Secretary of State for Amateur Sport, Denis Coderre, appointed a Work Group
to develop such a system.26 The Report of the Work Group became the
blueprint from which Canada's new dispute resolution system for sport
evolved.27 Consequently, legislation was drafted, and subsequently passed
into law,28 establishing a non-profit corporation called the Sport Dispute
Resolution Centre of Canada (SDRCC), 29 the purpose of which was to house
the new program and provide resources to Canadian sport organizations.30
The focal element of the system is an independent arbitration mechanism.31
The rules and regulations of the arbitration mechanism were devised and
developed by a specifically appointed Implementation Committee and were
22. Hayes, supra note 4, at 27.
23. Haslip, supra note 1, at 263.
24. Id. In 1994, the now defunct Canadian Sport Council initiated a process to put in place an
independent, voluntary arbitration and mediation system intended to serve exclusively the Canadian
sport community.
25. WORK GROUP TO THE SECY OF STATE (AMATEUR SPORT), A WIN-WIN SOLUTION:
CREATING A NATIONAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM FOR AMATEUR SPORT IN
CANADA 6 (2000), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/pubs/win-e.pdf.
26. Id.
27. The program includes both arbitration and mediation services. Few mediations have been
done as most disputes revolve around selection issues, and because they come on the eve of a major
competition, they are not open to mediation.
28. Physical Activity and Sport Act, 2003 S.C., ch. 2 (Can.), available at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/p-13.4/92297.html.
29. Id.
30. The Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada's (SDRCC) website is found at
www.adrsportred.ca.
31. A mediation component is available as well as a web-based resource centre.
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embedded into the program with few modifications as it was officially
launched in April 2004.
The Report of the Work Group (Report) included in its recommendations
the implementation of most, if not all, of the beneficial factors of an
independent arbitration system previously described; 32 that is, the arbitration
process should be sport specific, independent, cost efficient, timely, and
confidential.
It also addressed, to some extent, the function of such a system of
arbitration within the dispute resolution process of the Canadian sport
community, at least at the national level. In doing so it acknowledged the
right of athletes and coaches in the sport system to due process or "natural
justice"33 in the treatment they receive from sport organizations. But, it also
noted that in too many instances those rights were being violated or even
ignored. The Report looked to the reasons for this. "Sometimes the
infringement of rights is a result of the substance of a rule or regulation.
Sometimes it is as a result of the procedures - or a lack of - used to enforce
the rules. Sometimes it simply results from poor or unfair decision-making."
34 Further, the Report stated, "[w]here the Work Group saw the need for
dramatic improvement is where the right to natural justice is jeopardized by
inconsistencies and deficiencies in an organization's policies and procedures
or where decision-makers lack proper knowledge" 35 to make decisions in
accordance with the principles of natural justice.
Thus, the Work Group pointed to problems not only in the manner in
which decisions were sometimes made within sport organizations, but also
found that the very policies guiding such decision-making were, at times,
flawed. With respect to this latter source of problems, the Report stated:
The Work Group acknowledges the right of a sports body to develop
and implement its own policies through a democratic process and this
Report is not intended to infringe on that process in any way.
Disputes over the substance of a policy should continue to be dealt
with through the decision-making processes of each sport
organization. 36
It would seem the Work Group, within the Report, defined to a large
extent what it saw as the role or function of the anticipated independent
32. WORK GROUP TO THE SECY OF STATE, supra note 25, at 12 (Recommendation 3).
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 8.
36. Id.
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arbitration process as part of the dispute resolution systems of national sport
organizations. Substantive policy was to remain the prerogative of the sport
organization. The role of the arbitrator was to ensure decisions were made
fairly, in compliance with the rules of procedural fairness, and in conformance
with the policies of the organization. This view precisely reflects the
minimum application of the law as it applies to private tribunals and thus, to
sport organizations. 37 The difficulty, of course, arises where the rules or
policies are poorly crafted as suggested in the Report. When this occurs,
should the arbitrator note the ambiguity and send the matter back to the initial
decision maker? Or should the arbitrator correct the ambiguity or flaw and in
so doing run the risk of re-writing the rule or policy? The Work Group was
not clear on the role of the adjudicator in such circumstances. 38
In McCaig v. Canadian Yachting Ass 'n39 (CYA), a case heard before the
introduction of the current sport-specific arbitration program, the court
recognized its jurisdiction to rectify an error of drafting but refused to rewrite
the selection policy. 40 In that case, the CYA had failed to incorporate into its
selection policy any contingency for inclement weather. 41 As a result, when
one of the three regattas was cancelled due to foul and unsafe weather
conditions, CYA had not been able to follow the selection policy as it had
originally been written.42 The court wrote: "Apart from a claim of
rectification, I know of no basis upon which a Court can rewrite a contract
inserting a fresh clause in an agreement, no matter how desirable it might
be."4
3
Similarly, in Roberge v. Judo Canada,44 a decision of three arbitrators
(preceding the current national arbitration program) sitting in review of a
decision of an internal appeal, the adjudicators refused to alter or rewrite the
tie breaking mechanism set out in the selection policy when it did not operate
in the manner intended (or at all, as it turned out).45  In that case the
37. Lee v. Showmen's Guild of Gr. Brit., [1952] 2 Q.B. 329 (Can.).
38. It has however, attempted to provide some resources for policy development through a web-
based resource centre.
39. No. C196-01-96624 (Man. Q.B. Apr. 24, 1996) (Can.) (unreported decision).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 6.
44. Arbitration pursuant to Article 5 of NT Policy 16 (now Section 1(j) of NT Policy 18) of Judo
Canada's National Team Handbook (June 21, 1996) (on file with author). The current version of the
Judo Canada National Team Handbook can be found at http://www.judocanada.org/athletes/
NTH2005%20EN.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
45. Id.
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Adjudicative Panel wrote:
What the [Appeal Panel] did, in effect, was to substitute its own
decision as to who was the better athlete and accordingly manipulated
the rules of the Handbook by reversing the order of the criteria to
arrive at that conclusion. This is clearly inappropriate, especially in a
case such as this, where the tie-breaking formula contained criteria
that were clear, concise, objective and non-discretionary. It is not
within the jurisdiction of the [Appeal Panel] to intervene into the
affairs of Judo Canada and re-write their selection rules based on what
the [Appeal Panel] thinks is fair, or what it thinks the criteria should
be in order to select the best possible athlete.
46
Both decisions reflect the past pattern of decision-makers who were not
willing to make changes to policy, even policy that was seriously flawed,
however desirable that might have been in the circumstances. It remains to be
seen how the rules of the new arbitration system will affect this past practice.
III. SPORT ORGANIZATIONS AS PRIVATE TRIBUNALS
The vast majority of sport organizations are private tribunals47- that is,
they are autonomous, 48 self-governing, private organizations that have the
power to write rules, make decisions, and take actions that affect their
members, participants, and constituents. 49
As private tribunals with the power to make their own rules, sport
organizations derive their authority from their constitution, bylaws, policies,
procedures, and rules. Taken together, these are the governing documents of
the organization and form a contract between the organization and its
members. 50 This contract is the foundation of the organization's structure and
contains the rules by which the organization and the members govern
themselves. It provides the organization with the legal authority to establish
the rights, privileges, and obligations of membership.
Ideally, every sports organization should have policies relating to the key
areas of governance. Included in these should be policies relating to the areas
of eligibility and team selection (the awarding of privileges), conduct and
discipline (the removal of privileges), and appeals, mediation, and arbitration
46. Id.
47. Also referred to as domestic or consensual tribunals (as opposed to statutory tribunals)
48. Typically incorporated as a non-profit corporation.
49. Blake, supra note 11, at 1.
50. Lee, 2 Q.B. at 344, 352-53.
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(the resolution of disputes about the awarding and removal of privileges). 51 In
Canada, every national sport organization receiving federal funding must have
an appeal policy as well as a provision for independent arbitration of those
disputes that have exhausted the internal appeal mechanisms of the
organization but which continue to be contentious. 52
While sport organizations are autonomous and have the authority to
govern themselves and their members, they also have a fundamental obligation
to do so in accordance with the principles of procedural fairness and natural
justice.5 3 This was clearly laid out by Lord Denning in Lee v. Showmen's
Guild of Great Britain54:
Although the jurisdiction of a domestic tribunal is founded on
contract, express or implied, nevertheless the parties are not free to
make any contract they like. There are important limitations imposed
by public policy. The tribunal must, for instance, observe the
principles of natural justice. They must give the man notice of the
charge and a reasonable opportunity of meeting it. Any stipulation to
the contrary would be invalid. They cannot stipulate for a power to
condemn a man unheard.... Another limitation arises out of the well
known principle that parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary
courts of their jurisdiction. They can of course, agree to leave
questions of law, as well as questions of fact, to the decision of the
domestic tribunal. They can, indeed, make the tribunal the final
arbiter on questions of fact, but they cannot make it the final arbiter on
questions of law.55
The decisions of a sport organization are thus open to judicial review
where they breach the rules of natural justice. It should be noted, however,
that 'judicial review' is not the same as an appeal. In general, unless explicitly
delegated, the courts do not have the right to substitute their appraisal of the
merits of a lawfully made decision of a decision-maker as they might in the
51. These are policies dealing with the awarding and revocation of rights and privileges that a
member enjoys and disputes over the allocation or revocation of such rights and privileges and
obligations, respectively.
52. Such requirements come as part of the Federal Sport Funding and Accountability Framework
for each sport organization and are a prerequisite for funding. This requirement for an arbitration
clause was mandated by the federal government in 1999. At that time, the nature of the arbitration
was not defined nor was a common forum for such arbitration available to the sport community. See
Haslip, supra note 1, at 246.
53. Blake, supra note 11, at 13. In Canada, these are virtually synonymous.
54. 2 Q.B. at 342.
55. Id. (citations omitted).
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context of an appeal. 56 The courts, unless granted a broader scope of review,
are limited to errors of jurisdiction. 57
IV. GROUNDS FOR APPEAL
This section addresses the nature of appeals. While examining the appeal
mechanism incorporated by most national sport organizations, the grounds
upon which an initial decision may be appealed within a sport organization
can be defined either narrowly or broadly. Typically, narrow grounds of
appeal reflect the same grounds available for judicial review, i.e., errors in
procedure or errors of jurisdiction. Alternatively, an organization can choose
to broaden the grounds of appeal to allow a more extensive review of the
initial decision to the point where an appeal can be a full rehearing of a matter.
A model appeal policy made available to sport organizations through the
Interim National Dispute Resolution Program for Amateur Sport,58 which is
the same as, or close to, the already existing appeal policies of many of the
national sport organization across Canada, 59 incorporates these narrow
grounds for review. 60 Very few organizations use the broad grounds of
review.61
The rationale behind using a narrow scope of appeal is set out in the
annotation to the model appeal policy:
56. DAVID P. JONES & ANNE DE VILLARS, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6 (3d ed.
1999).
57. Errors of jurisdiction include errors of law, procedural errors, a lack of consideration of
relevant matters or a consideration of irrelevant matters, abuse of discretion, and acting ultra vires.
Id. at 7.
58. An interim alternate dispute resolution program was initiated pursuant to the Report of the
Work Group. WORK GROUP TO THE SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 25. It was known as the
ADRsportRED Program and ran from December 2001 to April 2004 when the permanent program
came on line. As a part of the interim program a number of resources, including policy resources,
have been made available to the sport community. The "Model" Appeal Policy Template can be
found at: SDRCC, APPEAL POLICY PACKAGE 13-36 (2004), available at
http://www.adrsportred.ca/resource-centre/SDRCCAppealPackage..e.doc [hereinafter APPEAL
POLICY PACKAGE].
59. See generally SDRCC, Appeals Policies, available at http://www.adrsportred.ca/
resourcecentre/appeal-policies-e.cfm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Appeals Policies].
60. APPEAL POLICY PACKAGE, supra note 58, § 9.1 at 44 (setting out the grounds for appeal and
includes: lack of authority or jurisdiction to make the decision, failing to follow procedures as set out
in a policy, making a decision influenced by bias, an exercise of discretion for an improper purpose
and making a decision that is grossly unfair or unreasonable).
61. The members of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Work Group, of which the author was
one, received and reviewed the policies of sixteen national sport organizations (NSO) and four multi-
sport organizations (on file with the author). For appeal policies of an additional twenty NSO's, see
Appeals Policies, supra note 59.
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Appeals are not for re-deciding matters. They are for correcting errors
in decision-making. An appeal policy exists to make sure that
decision-makers make only those decisions they have the power to
make, that decision-makers are unbiased, and that decisions are made
fairly and according to the organization's policies and procedures. An
Appellant cannot challenge a decision simply because he or she
disagrees with it.62
Essentially, the narrow scope of appeal recognizes the proper policy-
making role of the organization. It does not preclude appeals where a policy
has been improperly adopted or adopted in bad faith, but where a policy has
been properly and lawfully adopted by the organization, it should not be the
subject of appeal by an individual member who does not support such a
policy. 63 Such differences should more properly be addressed through
democratic channels within the governance and policy-making structure of the
organization.
Thus, the typical dispute resolution system operating within Canadian
sport governing organizations initially involved three levels of decision-
making: an initial forum for decision-making, typically done in accordance
with the terms and conditions set out in a policy (for example, selection
decisions, conduct decisions, and athlete carding decisions); 64 a second level
providing an opportunity to appeal that decision within the organization; and
where a jurisdictional or procedural error is alleged, a third and subsequent
opportunity to seek judicial review of the appeal decision before the courts.
Added to these three layers in 1999 was, for some, the opportunity to seek
independent arbitration of an appeal decision.65 The nature of the arbitration
was not specifically mandated by Sport Canada (a unit of the federal
government) nor, in most cases, defined by the sport organization and, by and
large, was used by a small handful of national sport organizations. 66
V. INTRODUCING A PROCESS OF ARBITRATION
Rules of arbitration need to be carefully crafted so that the Canadian
arbitration system in fact addresses the issues identified by the Work Group.
62. APPEAL POLICY PACKAGE, supra note 58, § 9.1 at 44.
63. For example, in Hall & Samuel v. Bobsleigh Can. (an independent appeal of the 1998-99
National Team selection, Aug. 19, 1999) (on file with the author), the Appeal Panel found the
organization had acted improperly in the manner in which it had introduced its selection policy.
64. Athletes may be carded by their sport organization. Carded athletes receive funding, the
amount of which is determined by the level of carding accorded the athlete.
65. See McCaig, No. C196-01-96624.
66. Id.
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After all, arbitration was one of the main mechanisms identified to help
ameliorate the problems identified by the Work Group. The next sections will
address three important areas of rule-making that have a direct bearing on how
the arbitration process is, or is not, designed to address those issues.
A. Scope of Review in Sport Arbitration
Under the new Canadian alternative dispute resolution program for sport
(known as the ADRsportRED Program), an arbitration mechanism was
introduced in April 2004 to operate between the second and third levels of
hearing discussed above.67 While such a mechanism cannot completely oust
the jurisdiction of the courts, 68 it is certainly a mechanism that has been
established to be "final and binding" on the parties. 69 The program operates
on a voluntary basis; however, its acceptance and use has been made
contingent on the receipt of government funding.70 Essentially, most national
sport organizations in Canada could not operate without federal government
funding assistance, making this program virtually mandatory.
Article RA-15 of the rules of procedures adopted for the ADRsportRED
Program sets out the scope of review for the adjudicator(s). 71 It reads:
The Panel shall have full power to review the facts and the law. In
particular, the Panel may substitute its decision for the decision that
gave rise to the Sports-related dispute and may substitute such
measures and grant such remedies or relief that it deems just and
equitable in the circumstances.72
The program contemplates a full hearing de novo of the original matter.
The effect of this rule is that the arbitration is a complete new hearing of a
67. It is intended to supersede the alternate dispute resolution provision introduced in 1999. See
WORK GROUP FOR THE SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 25.
68. Blake, supra note 11, at 174. Indeed, in Rolland v. Swim/Natation Can. (SDRCC, June 21,
2002), available at http://www.adrsportred.ca/resourcecentre/pdf/english/S-906518.pdf, the
complainant did seek the assistance of the courts to enforce the decision of the ADRsportRED
arbitrator.
69. SDRCC, ADR-SPORT-RED CODE art. RA-16 (2004), available at http://www.adrsportred.ca/
tribunal/doc/CodeFinalE.doc [hereinafter ADR-SPORT-RED CODE]. Article RA-16 (b) of the
arbitration rules reads: "The award shall be final and binding upon the Parties.... Proceedings
before a panel may not be restrained by injunction, prohibition or other process or proceeding in a
court and are not removable by certiorari or otherwise to a court."
70. A significant majority of national sport organizations rely upon government funding and, in
fact, receive the bulk of their funding from the federal government (a break down of government
funding per sport can be found at: Sport Canada, 2002-03 Contribution Recipients,
http://www.pch.gc.calprogs/sc/contributions/2002-2003/0002-3_e.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005)).
71. ADR-SpoRT-RED CODE, supra note 69, art. RA-15.
72. Id.
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matter and gives the adjudicator broad decision-making powers. It has in fact,
theoretically 73 changed the dispute resolution process at the national level in
sport in Canada from that of a pyramid where, as previously described, the
breadth of review narrows at each subsequent level of hearing, to that of an
hourglass where, once the review leaves the purview of the sport organization
and goes to independent arbitration, it is completely open for a rehearing and
the adjudicator has full discretion to substitute his or her decision for that of
the original decision-makers within the organization. 74
The question arises, how broad is the scope of review under the rules of
procedure for the new system of arbitration for sport in Canada? There are a
number of aspects of Article RA- 15 of the rules of procedure that speak to the
breadth of authority of the arbitrator. First, an arbitrator may rehear a matter
following an appeal within the sport organization (or, if the parties to a dispute
agree, they may bypass the internal appeal of the sport organization and move
directly to independent arbitration). 75 On a rehearing, the adjudicator has
authority to issue subpoenas, 76 arrange for examination of witnesses and
expert witnesses where necessary, 77 request the disclosure of documents,78
and call its own witnesses and expert witnesses. 79 Thus, under the rules of
arbitration, the arbitrator has very broad scope and ability to review any
internal decision of a sport organization. Indeed, in many cases, the
adjudicator has even greater scope of review than the internal appeal panel of
the sport organization where the organization has adopted a narrow basis of
review as a part of its own internal appeal policy. In these situations, it is clear
that the structure of the review process (i.e., independent arbitration) has
considerably broadened the scope of review of the traditional design of the
appeal mechanism, disturbing what was an incremental model where the scope
of review narrowed the further a challenge to a decision moved along the
system. That model has been replaced by one where the first level of legal
challenge is narrow, the second level is wide open - thus raising the question,
why would an appellant bother with the first level - and the third level is
73. Theoretically, because, for example, in the case of a team selection dispute where the
selection criteria required the decision-maker, i.e., the coach or team of coaches, to observe the
athletes over time in a number of competitions on a series of criteria, the adjudicator of course cannot
actually engage in a hearing de novo. With regard to other disputes (e.g., disciplinary or contractual
disputes) a hearing de novo may be possible.
74. ADR-SPORT-RED CODE, supra note 69, art. RA-15.
75. Id. art. RA-1(b).
76. Id. art. RA-14.4(d).
77. Id. art. RA-14.4(b).
78. Id. art. RA-14.4(a).
79. Id. art. RA-14.4(c).
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narrow once again.
B. What is the appropriate standard of review?
Having considered the scope of review of a decision, the question now
arises as to what standard of review an adjudicator should use in determining
that an error has taken place. At its root, a discussion of the standard of
review is about what constitutes an error. Any party challenging a decision is
in fact alleging that the original decision-maker made an error. The question
the adjudicator must ask is "what threshold of error must be met for the
decision to be quashed or reversed? 80 This is a very important question as
the outcome of any arbitration can very well turn on the answer. As noted by
one legal scholar: "The need to determine and apply the proper standard of
review is inescapable in any legal system charging one decision-maker with
the responsibility of reviewing the decisions of another decision-maker." 8
1
There are two categories of errors: procedural errors and substantive
errors. Clearly, a procedural error (e.g., not following the procedure as set out
in a policy such as one of selection or discipline) would constitute a breach of
procedural fairness or due process and would typically result in an adjudicator
quashing or reversing the decision. This does not mean that there is no leeway
for the adjudicator to assess the circumstances and other factors at play in
defining what constitutes fairness in the circumstances. There is room for
some degree of deference to be given to the procedures used by the tribunal.
For example, the rules of a discipline policy may allow for various time
limitations within the hearing to be abridged or extended. What is fair in
terms of a decision to abridge or extend a timeline will depend on the
circumstances and, in proper circumstances, the reviewer of a decision may
accord deference to such a decision. In Fernandes v. Sport North
Federation,82 the court noted the principles of natural justice are flexible and
depends on the circumstances in which the question arises; "[t]he ultimate
question is whether the procedures adopted were fair in all the
80. This is not to be confused with the standard of proof a complainant must meet in order to
make out their case. Standard of proof, also referred to as the burden of proof, is "[t]he obligation of a
party to establish by evidence a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the trier of
fact or the court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 178 (5th ed. 1979).
81. FRANK A. V. FALZON, STANDARD OF REVIEW ON JuDICIAL REVIEW OR APPEAL 6-7 (2001),
available at http://www.gov.bc.ca/ajo/down/standard of review.pdf. Thus, this question of what
standard of review to apply concerns internal appeals as well as external arbitrations.
82. Fernandes v. Sport N. Fed'n, [1996] N.W.T.R. 118 (Can.). There being no policy or rule to
govern the specific situation, the Respondent Organization improvised with ad hoc rules. While not
the most desirable situation, the Court nonetheless upheld the decision of the Organization as being
made in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
[Vol. 16:1
SPORT-SPECIFIC ARBITRA TION
circumstances." 83  In other words, the standard of review for a procedural
error is what a reasonable person would view as fair given the
circumstances. 84
A substantive error - that is errors of fact, law, or discretion - lends itself
to an entirely different kind of review. In these cases, reviewers of decisions
must make sure they clearly understand their role:85
Is it the job of the reviewer to step into the shoes of the original decision-
maker and uphold the decision only if he or she agrees with it - or would this
be going beyond his/her intended jurisdiction?
Should the reviewer defer to the original decision-maker's decision, even
if he/she might have come to a different decision?
If some degree of deference to the original decision-maker is appropriate,
are there any limits to such deference?
The Canadian judicial system has recognized a spectrum of standards of
review for alleged substantive errors, each representing a different degree of
judicial tolerance for what might be defined as an error. Within this spectrum,
three standards have been identified as "major signposts." 86  At the one
extreme is the most deferential standard reflected in the "patently
unreasonable" test. 87 Using this standard, only decisions that are "clearly
irrational" will be overturned. 88 At the other extreme is the least deferential
standard reflected in the "correctness" test.89 Using this standard, a decision
may be overturned if the reviewer simply disagrees with the original decision-
maker. 90  The third, or intermediate standard is reflected in the
"reasonableness simpliciter" test. 91  Using this test, a decision will be
overturned if it is unreasonable. 92
There is no explicit rule within the Code of Procedures of the
ADRsportRED Program of arbitration relating to the standard of review.
Perhaps the closest reference comes from Article RA- 15 of the Rules quoted
83. Id. 19.
84. FALZON, supra note 81, at 6 n.9.
85. JONES & VILLARS, supra note 56, at 7.
86. Int'l Forest Products Ltd. v. British Columbia, No. A970934, 80 A.C.W.S. (3d) 43
(B.C.S.C. June 3, 1998). "One concludes that the number of 'standards' on the spectrum is
theoretically infinite but that, practically, we require major signposts marking credibly distinctive
standards."
87. Canada v. Pub. Serv. Alliance, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941, 963.
88. Id. at 963-64.
89. Univ. of British Columbia v. Berg, No. 22638, 40 A.C.W.S. (3d) 38 (Can. May 19, 1993).
90. See id.
91. Canadav. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748.
92. Id. at 765.
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previously in a discussion of the remedy granting power of the adjudicator. 93
The pertinent part of Article RA-15 reads: "In particular, the Panel may
substitute its decision for the decision that gave rise to the Sports-related
dispute and may substitute such measures and grant such remedies and relief
that it deems just and equitable in the circumstances. " 94 If an error is found,
then the adjudicator can substitute a remedy that is just and equitable,
implying that the previous decision was not just and equitable. It may thus be
inferred the standard of review may be that the decision be "just and
equitable," except in the case of a doping appeal (which is now heard under
the ADRsportRED Program) where the standard of review is explicitly that of
"unreasonableness." 95  The Canadian Anti-Doping Regulations stipulate in
Section 9.1 "[a] decision of the Doping Tribunal or TUEC will only be
reversed if it is unreasonable." 96
While the subject of the standard of review has been, and continues to be a
topic of vigorous discussion within the legal community, it has, in general, not
been argued in sport cases coming before arbitrators or even the courts in
Canada. There are a couple of exceptions to this, the first being a sport doping
case 97 in which the adjudicator, applying the test of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Canada v. Mossop,98 found the appropriate standard of review to be
one of correctness. 99 In Roberge, an arbitration occurring prior to the current
program, the correctness standard was also explicitly used. 100 The same
standard of correctness was also explicitly followed in an arbitration case
heard under the Interim ADRsportRED Program. 101 However, in most of the
cases heard thus far under the ADRsportRED Program, as well as in previous
arbitrations of sport disputes in Canada, it would appear this standard has not
been consistently applied. In fact, the standard of review has not been raised
as an issue in most arbitrations under the program (or in previous arbitrations
93. ADR-SPORT-RED CODE, supra note 69, art. RA-15.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Appeals of Canadian Anti-doping decisions are now heard under the ADRsportRed
arbitration system using its rules, except where modified by the regulations of the Canadian Anti-
Doping Program (2004).
96. ADR-SPORT-RED CODE, supra note 69, art. AD-9.1.
97. Russell v. Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport, Arbitration award pursuant to Section 10 of
the Doping Control Standard Operating Procedures of the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport (Aug.
19, 1998) (on file with author).
98. [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554.
99. Id. 49.
100. Roberge, supra note 44.
101. Gordon v. Canadian Amateur Boxing Ass'n (SDRCC, July 16, 2003), available at
http://www.adrsportred.ca/resource-centre/pdf/english/S-903586.pdf.
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in sport). 102
Michael Lynk 0 3 identified a number of Canadian statutory tribunals that
have adopted a modified standard of review - one of substantial compliance
with natural justice, which he suggests, is a more realistic standard for many
private tribunals. 10 4 Using a standard of review of correctness he suggests
may lead to an outcome vastly different than that originally intended by the
governing documents of an organization when interpreted literally. 10 5 The
governing documents forming the contract between the sport organization and
its members are often not prepared by experts in drafting and thus are not
always precise or clear in their drafting. 10 6 As well, many of these governing
documents, such as constitutions and by-laws, are long term and enduring in
their nature, and thus perhaps, he suggests, ought not always be interpreted as
one would interpret a contract that may be easily changed by the parties.
10 7
But, how far can an arbitrator go in reviewing the substance of a dispute
under the ADRsportRED Program (or in any arbitration for that matter)? It is
argued here that although the rules of procedure of the Canadian program give
the arbitrator broad discretion to hear matters and, indeed, even authority to
review the merits of a dispute (as opposed to a review purely for procedural or
jurisdictional errors), nevertheless, decision-makers within organizations
should be given deference particularly in decisions involving the use of
discretion. Selection to teams is one obvious example of a decision that has a
large discretionary element. As stated previously, discretion assumes a range
of decision choices and such choices ought to be respected by the adjudicator,
provided the discretion has been exercised properly. Such a position was
affirmed by Arbitrator Pound in the decision of Blais v. WTF Taekwondo
Ass'n of Canada1 °8 where he wrote, "[i]t is not, however, within the scope of
the powers of an arbitrator to re-write or re-design a selection process that has
been developed by experts within the sport (including its coaches), approved
by its constituent authorities and validated by the COC [Canadian Olympic
Committee] for purposes of team selection." 10 9
102. See Roberge, supra note 44.
103. Michael Lynk, Denning's Revenge: Judicial Formalism and the Application of Procedural
Fairness to Internal Union Hearings, 23 QUEEN'S L.J. 115, 125 (1997).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 169-71.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. (SDRCC May 9, 2003), available at http://www.adrsportred.ca/resource-Centre/pdf/
english/S-908860.pdf.
109. Id. at 5-6.
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In Boylen v. Equine Canada"Il0 Pound wrote:
I believe the correct standard in these circumstances to be that of
reasonableness and would be reluctant, absent full argument on more
explicit facts, to set the standard at a level of patent unreasonableness
before I could intervene. Similarly, I believe that sufficient deference
is warranted to decisions made by expert bodies, absent clear
misdirection, that mere correctness is too low a standard for
overturning such decisions.11'
The national arbitration system in Canada is fairly new and there have not
yet been a large number of cases heard before it. Nonetheless, certain trends
are emerging. It is clear that the rules of procedure for the arbitration of
disputes are broad in nature and give the arbitrator wide authority to review
prior decisions of an organization as well as wide discretion in crafting
remedies, even to the extent of affecting and altering, or having the effect of
altering, policies of the organization. The rules describe a broad process
producing an hourglass form of dispute resolution in the Canadian sport
resolution system essentially allowing adjudicators a much wider scope of
review than is afforded to internal decision-makers at the lower level or to
court judges at the upper level.
However, in reality, it is clear that the arbitrators within the program have
been reluctant to go so far. The arbitrators have limited their reviews and have
examined only whether or not organizations have followed their own policies
and have exercised their discretion properly. 112 They have essentially acted
with restraint and in accordance with a narrow form of review. 113 They have
not ventured so far as to affect the policies of organizations even where such
policies are seemingly flawed or where the arbitrator takes issue with such
policies.' 14 Arbitrators have respected the authority of sport organizations to
determine their own policies so long as such policies have been made properly
and in good faith. Such decisions of the arbitrators are now forming a
substantial body of jurisprudence and are informing (and perhaps it can be
said, constraining) the rules of procedure of this new system of arbitration for
110. (SDRCC July 11, 2004) available at http://www.adrsportred.ca/resource-centre/pdf/
english/S-946681 .pdf.
1ii. Id. at 12.
112. For example, see Sergerie v. WTF Taekwondo Ass'n of Can. (SDRCC Dec. 5, 2003)
available at http://www.adrsportred.ca/resource-centre/pdf/english/S-915758.pdf, where the
adjudicator was of the view the selection criteria were not crafted to select the best athlete, but
nonetheless felt he did not have the jurisdiction to interfere with the criteria themselves.
113. See id.
114. Id.
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sport in Canada as they affect the scope of review of decisions made within
the sport organization.
As noted by one legal scholar, thinking about questions, such as what
standard of review is appropriate for what questions, forces policy-makers to
think carefully about the fundamental purpose of the decision-making tribunal
and implications of that purpose for its design. 115 While speaking words of
warning directly to legislators, the words of Frank Falzon resonate clearly for
policy-makers of both systems of arbitration as well as internal organizational
appeal mechanisms:
Where legislators determine that an administrative tribunal serves
"core values", it will undermine those values to have the tribunal's
decisions regularly and easily challenged in the courts. Thus, the
decision about the standard of review will necessarily force legislators
to think about critical antecedent questions such as whether that [sic]
the tribunal has the jurisdiction, procedures, qualifications, expertise
and appointments necessary to carry out its function effectively. 116
C. What remedies should be available to the adjudicator?
In keeping with the practice of respecting a narrow scope of appeal,
adjudicators in appeals are also typically limited in their scope of authority
when ascribing remedies. Usually, where an appeal is upheld, an appeal
policy will direct the decision-maker to refer the matter back to the original
decision-maker for a new decision correcting the error or, where time, lack of
clear procedure, or lack of neutrality precludes the decision from being
remitted back to the original decision-maker, allow the adjudicator to vary the
original (impugned) decision and substitute his or her own. The rationale for
limiting the scope of the decision-making authority of the adjudicator is the
notion that appeal panels should have no greater authority than that of the
original decision-maker and, as such, should not be able to change or rewrite a
policy (for example, by altering selection criteria or inserting new clauses in a
selection process). 1 7 As well, the substitution of a decision can create havoc
for an organization.
In selection matters, for example, there is very often an element of
discretion. This is particularly so where selection cannot be based on an
objective standard (such as speed, height, strength, time, and rank) or where
selection of a number of individuals to a cohesive team is involved. The
115. FALZON, supra note 81, at 47.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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notion of discretion presumes there is a range of possible outcomes in the
decision-making exercise. Provided the discretion is exercised properly," 18
any one of the possible outcomes should be accepted (even if the reviewer
would have chosen a different option). This is particularly important in
selection decisions where a coach or panel of coaches may be juggling a
number of considerations and concerns in selecting the best possible team.
Team cohesion, team depth or bench strength, strategic or tactical
considerations, athlete substitutions, among other concerns, may be part of the
decision-making matrix and can easily be compromised where a reviewing
decision-maker substitutes his or her own decision for that of the coach. 119
The substitution of an adjudicator's decision to place an athlete on a team (in
place of another) can have a ripple effect well beyond that contemplated,
intended, or even recognized by the adjudicator.
The arbitrator under the rules of the ADRsportRED Program may
substitute his or her decision for that of the prior decision-maker. However, to
date the arbitrators of the program seem to have given deference to the policy-
making function of the organization and credence to the unique and
specialized knowledge and skill of the coach or coaches in making selection
decisions (provided such decisions are made in accordance with the properly
determined selection criteria and procedures of the organization). As noted by
Arbitrator Pound in refusing to substitute his own decision for that of the
original decision-maker in a selection dispute:
The Respondent [sport organization] has organizational goals that are
performance-related as well and has particular objectives in mind as it
selects athletes for various events. I have, however, seen no evidence
of any bad faith in the selection of the World Cup team and no
evidence that would point to any discrimination with respect to the
Claimant. There are many judgments to be made in team selection,
especially where there is no mechanical process (such as accumulated
points, etc.) in place. I am not willing to substitute my personal
judgment for that of the experienced wrestling coaches and CAWA
118. The exercise of discretion often draws allegation of bias, some of which may be founded
and others not. This speaks clearly to the need to provide a clear and transparent rationale for the
exercise of any discretion in decision-making.
119. In Rolland v. Swim/Natation Can., supra note 68, and Pierse v. Swimming/Natation Can.
(SDRCC, June 23, 2002), available at http://www.adrsportred.ca/resource-centre/pdf/englishlS-
906303.pdf, two separate appeals involving the same competition and selection criteria, two separate
adjudicators rendered decisions that appeared initially to the respondent sport organization to be
incompatible, requiring it to select two athletes where there was but one position available.
Complainant Rolland eventually sought enforcement through the court.
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officials in a matter of this nature. 120
Where a substituted decision of an arbitrator would have the effect of
modifying a policy of the sport organization, or even when a decision infringes
on the discretion given to the coach or other organizational decision-maker,
such a decision ought only to be imposed where the original decision-maker
abused his or her discretion or where the policy itself was made in bad faith. 121
Even where discretion has been abused, it may be argued the matter should be
returned, if possible, to the decision-maker to make the decision again,
correcting the error.
What of the case in which an arbitrator finds the selection criteria entirely
unrealistic or nonsensical? Does the arbitrator have the power to substitute his
or her version of better criteria (which would, in fact, have the effect of
changing the actual policy of the organization)? 122 Clearly, selection criteria
are not one hundred percent protected from review under the current rules of
the ADRsportRED Program, although arbitrations have, and it is argued
should, shown a high degree of deference to the decisions of expert sport
tribunals. Nonetheless, this deference is not absolute and there clearly is a
point at which an arbitrator would be permitted to intervene and amend the
selection criteria adopted by a sport organization. One would trust that such a
point would be approached with great caution and reluctance, and it would
probably be a situation of impossibility or complete absurdity.
It is interesting to note the arbitrator's decision in Sergerie v. WTF
Taekwondo Ass 'n, 123 a matter involving an appeal of the selection of athletes
to the 2002 Olympic Games.' 24 The selection criteria of the respondent sport
organization had the effect of totally precluding the highest ranked athlete, and
defending Olympic champion, from participating in the Olympic trials. 125 The
arbitrator commented on the ill-conceived nature of the selection criteria but
also noted that the respondent sport organization had properly adopted the
120. Medwidsky v. Canadian Amateur Wrestling Ass'n, at 5 (SDRCC, Oct. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.adrsportred.ca/resourcescentre/pdfenglish/S-90883 1.pdf. See also Zilberman v.
Canadian Amateur Wrestling Ass'n (SDRCC, July 28, 2003), available at
http://www.adrsportred.ca/resource-centre/pdf/english/S-909082.pdf (stating that "[t]he test [for an
error] lies in ascertaining whether, in this case, CAWA acted fairly and reasonably and not arbitrarily
or discriminatory in the application of its own rules and policy in reaching its impugned decision...
121. Medwidsky, supra note 120.
122. Policy formation is clearly the domain of the sport organization, if done properly.
123. Sergerie, supra note 112.
124. See id.
125. See id.
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criteria and had followed its own rules in the selection process. 126 That being
the case and in the absence of any malice or bad faith on the part of the sport
organization, the arbitrator determined he had no basis on which to overturn
the selection process. 127
It is clear that the scope of authority of the arbitrator in assessing a remedy
is being carefully applied under the new Canadian sport arbitration system.
The rules allow a broad exercise of authority, far in excess of what the typical
sport organization set out in its own appeal policies. There is emerging,
however, a compilation of decisions, a body of jurisprudence, which is in
effect describing the bounds of review of an independent arbitrator more
narrowly in a way that seems to respect the organization's decision-making
role but, as well, requires that such decisions be made properly and fairly.
CONCLUSION
The underlying premise of this paper is that the design of a sport-specific
arbitration mechanism must support and, indeed, further the desired function
of such a mechanism. Three rules of Canadian sport arbitration have been
identified as being particularly important in this regard: the scope of review
afforded the adjudicator, the standard of review in order to determine an error
and, lastly, the scope of authority of the adjudicator in assessing any remedy.
These three rules are not just rules of procedure. They also affect policy
and in so doing, they must be crafted carefully and explicitly, so as to ensure
the arbitration system fulfills the function intended by the creators. At the
same time, even if well crafted, such rules may nonetheless have some
unintended consequences, which must be addressed as the program matures.
The rules of arbitration within the Canadian alternate dispute resolution
system for sport were written to reflect (or "modeled after") 128 the rules of the
CAS. Consistency in rule making and decision-making is clearly a desirable
goal both domestically and internationally. 129  Indeed, a global and
harmonized system of dispute resolution, as there now is with doping, may be
an appropriate and desirable outcome. Nonetheless, the Canadian system is
built on domestic needs and circumstances. An international system of dispute
resolution (i.e., CAS) is built on different needs and goals. It is suggested the
function of CAS within the international sport community is different than that
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. ADRSPORTRED STEERING COMM., INTERIM PROGRAM REPORT 27 (Mar. 31, 2004)
available at http://www.adrsportred.ca/about/ Report/o202002-2004%20E.pdf [hereinafter INTERIM
PROGRAM REPORT].
129. Hayes, supra note 4, at 35.
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of a domestic one, such as the Canadian system, within the domestic context.
There may be some overlap but that needs to be carefully analyzed and the
rules of procedure carefully developed to reflect the similarities, but more
particularly, to reflect domestic outcomes.
The rules of arbitration were also crafted to address a number of
shortcomings identified by the Work Group in the prevailing dispute
resolution structure of the Canadian sport system. Specifically, problems
within organizational policies and procedures and a lack of appreciation or use
by decision-makers of the principles of natural justice were identified. Little
has been written on the intersection of the rules of arbitration and the function
and desired outcome of the process. The Canadian program is a new one and
a full analysis of the program has not yet been done. There is, however, one
segment of the Interim Program Report that does speak to the nature of the
rules of arbitration vis 6 vis the function of arbitration. An Interim Report was
written as the Interim Program, running since December 2001, folded into the
permanent program in April 2004. It gives some indication as to the rationale
for at least the nature of the hearing contemplated and the scope of review
accorded to arbitrators under the program:
The Work Group, the Implementation Committee and the Committee
all concur that the ADR program should be based on the concept of
trial de novo. While considerable discussion has surrounded the
possibility of limiting the scope of review to the traditional grounds of
appeal, there was recognition of the lack of sophistication of parties
that warranted a full review and examination by an arbitrator. The
Committee urges the SDRCC to continue with the practice of trial de
novo. 130
If a "lack of sophistication" requires the sort of policy initiative that
essentially usurps the reviewing role of the sport organization,131 it does beg
the question about the nature of this lack of sophistication and the impact on
organizational decision-making.
A comprehensive understanding of the reasons or rationale underlying the
implementation of at least the three policy-based rules discussed in this paper
is necessary, particularly to ensure it is the right mechanism for the purposes
130. INTERIM PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 128, at 27.
131. ADRsPORTRED STEERING COMM., REPORT ON THE MAJOR GAMES TEAM SELECTION
CASES 28 (Sept. 10, 2002) available at http://www.adrsportred.ca/pdf/major-gameseng.pdf. This
suggests reviews of selection decisions, except for those involving discretionary decisions, be
forwarded directly to the arbitration process without first going through the internal appeal process of
the sport organization. This, it is suggested, would be a substantial policy shift, not only for the sport
organization but as well in the traditional manner in which decisions of independent tribunals are
reviewed.
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desired and that its rule structure is in fact accomplishing what it, along with
other measures within the Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada were put
in place to do.
